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1. Introduction
Government intervention in African agriculture has been extensive, often
regulating the price farmers receive for their products while subsidizing inputs to pursue
cheap food policy goals (Bates, 1989).  In fact, in the 1980s external donors demanded
that this sort of intervention be ended under the so-called structural adjustment
programs (World Bank, 1989).  An understanding of the political and economic rationale
and impacts of past policies is essential to design politically viable reforms.  Often,
structural adjustment policies (SAPs) and other reforms are applied with the
preconception, but without evidence, that they will be beneficial to agricultural producers
or the country as a whole.
The thrust of this article is to examine the impact of structural adjustment
programs in the Senegalese peanuts (also called groundnuts) market.  It pursues two
related objectives.  First, it identifies and assesses the key political-economic factors
shaping the regulated price of peanuts in the post-independence period.  Second, it
assesses the impacts of SAPs on social welfare and the welfare of the peanut
producers in particular.  It is instructive to examine the Senegalese peanut case
because it possesses the typical features of government intervention in Africa: past
price regulation by marketing boards, subsidization of inputs, and recent reforms under
structural adjustment programs.  Thus the analysis provides rich lessons and
methodology applicable not only to Senegal but also to other cases in the continent.
2. The Case of Peanuts in Senegal
The Senegalese economy relies heavily on the performance of the peanut
sector, which accounts for 40 to 50% of export earnings and 50% of agricultural
production (World Bank, 1989; Jammeh, 1987).  Because this sector is both
economically and politically vital, it is not surprising that government intervention has
been pervasive.
The first decisions taken after independence in 1960 revealed the government’s
intention to further intervene in agriculture (Waterbury, 1987a).  The new authorities
initiated a vast government action plan aimed at developing the peanut sector, via
intervention in its production and marketing.  From 1960 to the early 1980s the
production policy program relied on a credit system along with input subsidies.  The
credit system enabled producers to acquire seed, fertilizer, and equipment.  For
instance, during the first two decades of post-independence, subsidies on fertilizer
averaged 56% of the factory unit cost (Beghin, 1991).
The marketing policy program consisted mainly of regulating prices through a
double mechanism.  First, the government decided early on to restrict the entry of
private traders into the groundnut market.  These traders were eventually eliminated,and the state marketing board became the sole institution allowed to buy groundnuts
from farmers.  Second, the output price of peanuts was administratively set.  A
committee essentially dominated by bureaucratic actors and representatives of the
peanut crushing firms usually proposed the price to be paid to the farmers.  The final
decision has always been taken by the President (Jammeh, 1987).
A persistent balance of payments deficit, coupled with shortages of foreign
exchange essential for loan repayments, led the Senegalese authorities to launch a
structural adjustment program in the early 1980s under pressure from external donors
(World Bank, 1989; Durufle, 1995; Vengroff and Creevey, 1997).  Farm input subsidies
were lifted and the credit system terminated.  Eventually, under heavy pressure from the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, public officials finally decided to
dissolve the marketing board and transferred the marketing functions to the state-owned
oil plants.  In addition, the country was required to lift the import embargo on vegetable
oil for domestic consumption.
3. Theoretical Model of Pricing Decisions
Let  i q  denote the peanut production of the i
th farmer (i=1,…,n) so that
) ( i i i V q Q ￿ =  is total peanut production.  The aggregate farm supply function is thus
given by
), , ( V P f Q = (1)
where Q is the quantity of peanuts supplied, P is the peanut price and V is a vector of
supply shifters.
Using the producer surplus (PS) concept as a money-metric measure of farmers’
welfare (Just et al., 1982), it follows that
PS PQ S Q dQ
Q
Q = -￿ 0 ( ) (2)
where P=S(Q) is the inverse farm supply curve, holding V constant, and the term Q
0 is
the economically meaningful minimum level of supply when P=0 or when Q=0.
Let the oil processing industry have m firms producing a homogeneous output (Z)
from peanuts Q.  Processors’ welfare is then denoted by
PCS P s aQ caQ PQ z = + - - ( ) 1   (3)
where Pz is the border price of peanut oil, s is a subsidy or tax on oil sold in the world
market, and c is the per unit cost of processing oil assumed to be equal across firms.
For simplicity, the input-output ratio of groundnuts to oil, is assumed to be constant as
defined by Z = aQ where a is a production coefficient.provided more incentives to farmers.  In the early 1990s, the peanut processors appear
to be reviving their market power.
The structural adjustment policy has affected producers of groundnuts in at least
three different ways.  First, the end of the input support program, meant that both input
subsidies and loans were terminated for farmers.  Second, the price increase that
followed the new policy implementation was be beneficial.  Finally, the vegetable oil
import policy has had some adverse effects on peanut prices.  All simulations are
conducted for the 1980-95 period only.  The main results are shown in Table 2 and are
discussed below.
The removal of the subsidy program has been quite detrimental to peanut
producers. Indeed, farmers were unable to acquire adequate amounts of fertilizer due to
lack of a credit system and high fertilizer prices.  When the assumption of no structural
adjustment is made (by setting its dummy variable and oil imports to zero), the effect is
a jump in the level of political weight in favor of processors.  Consequently, peanut
prices would have dropped dramatically throughout the period if the structural
adjustment policies had not taken place.
As seen above, structural adjustment policies conferred both costs and benefits
on farmers.  As shown in Table 2, the cost effect more than offsets the beneficial peanut
price impact in the transition period.  From 1980 to 1983, farmers recorded welfare
gains because fertilizer subsidies were still provided.  However, from 1984 onward the
net welfare effect is always negative with the exception of 1988.  The adverse impact of
increased cost from eliminating input subsidies and the credit system exceeds the
beneficial impact from incentives through higher prices.
To get a more complete picture of the welfare changes that operate in the peanut
sector, one needs to consider the impacts of SAPs on processors, consumers, and the
government.  As shown in Table 2, processors lost on average about 3 billion CFA
francs a year compared to what they would have experienced without SAPs.  This does
not account, however, for state subsidies and other benefits accruing from the import of
vegetable oil, for instance.  But there is no doubt that the liberalization process has
eroded the lucrative position granted to oil mills through the 1970s.
The import of vegetable oil under SAPs provided consumers with cheaper oil. To
account for the welfare benefit to consumers, vegetable oil is treated as a new good
introduced in a market in which peanut oil is a close substitute (Hausman, 1997).
  A
demand equation for vegetable oil was specified after using the estimated coefficients,
and a reservation price for vegetable oil was calculated.  It turns out that consumers
gained about 4.4 billion CFA francs a year from this access to cheaper oil.
Overall, the welfare calculations show a deadweight loss.  Two explanations are
advanced.  First, the decline in peanut production has seriously jeopardized the
profitability of oil mills, which are running under capacity.  Second, and related to this,
the drastic response to higher fertilizer prices and the associated welfare losses might
be indicative of possible market failures in credit markets or of incomplete markets(Stiglitz, 1987).  For instance, the losses from the removal of fertilizer subsidies far
exceed the taxpayer savings from doing so.
6. Concluding Remarks
Past policies were fiscally unsustainable and perhaps politically unfeasible
because of the pressure for change from external donors.  SAPs have no doubt
depoliticized pricing decisions in the movement from governments to markets.
However, the question is what to do to address the suffering and welfare losses created
by structural adjustment policies in the interim time before the “long run.”  A viable way
to counteract the increases in production costs caused by fertilizer price increases may
be to increase farmers’ productivity.  Since yield-increasing knowledge already exists in
research centers in Senegal, one effective way is to transfer this knowledge to farmers
via extension and outreach activities.  Another way is to target temporary relief
programs toward the losers in structural adjustment programs during the “adjustment”
period.  In the case of peanut pricing in Senegal, our results indicate that the World
Bank and the IMF’s adjustment programs have likely made peanut producers and the
Senegalese society permanent losers.
A particular element of SAPs that appear to have been the most detrimental in
the Senegalese peanut case is the abolition of fertilizer subsidies and credit.  This
particular aspect of SAP policies resulted in dramatic decreases in peanut production,
undermining the profitability of the peanut processing plants as well.  Not only was the
increase in peanut prices insufficient to offset these losses, but the cost to taxpayers
was much lower than the benefits from fertilizer subsidies.  This suggests that these
subsidies and the concurrent credit system were addressing important market failures.References
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Senegal, EDI working papers, Deloitte Haskins and Sells.Table 1.  Parameter Estimates for the Supply and Pricing Equations.
Variables Notation Coefficient T-ratio
Supply Response
Intercept 1 0.6923 0.17
Price of Peanuts ln Pt 0.4889*** 4.27
Price of millet ln Pmt-1 0.6102* 1.87
Price of Fertilizer lnPFt -0.5451*** -3.30
Rainfall RFt 0.9451*** 2.78
Drought DRYt -0.6504*** -2.93
Price Equation
Structural Adjustment Adjustt -0.2153*** -2.52
Industrial Policy Industt 0.3438*** 3.89
Elections Electt -0.1035* -1.99
Urban Pressure Urbt 2.4614*** 8.10
Imported Vegetable Oil Imvt 0.3100* 1.76
Notes:  One, two, and three asterisks indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent
levels.  The results were obtained via nonlinear 3SLS using 1960-95 data.Table 2.  Impact of SAPs on Peanut Market Performance in Senegal.
-------------------------------SAP Period -----------------------
1970-79 1980-95 1980-83 1984-95
----------------------Means for the Period---------------------
Producer Price 1993 97 85 96 81
(1993 CFA Francs per Kg.)
----------------------------1000 tons ------------------------------
Marketed Production
  (Peanuts in shells) 585 354 413 335
Production Peanut Oil 199 118 126 115
Exports Peanut Oil 155 96 125 86
Veg. Oil Imports 0 52 56 51
Foreign Exchange
  (million US$) 125 65 49 44
------------------------1993 million CFAs-------------------
Changes in Welfare:
Producer Surplus -- 2,956 6,756 -6,194
Cost Effect -- -6,692 0 -8,923
Price Effect -- 3,736 6,756 2,729
Processor Surplus -- -4,734 5,871 -4,354
Fertilizer Sub Savings -- 229 -2,674 1,196
Consumer Surplus -- 4,411 5,901 3,915
Net Welfare Effect -- -3,050 4,112 -5,437
Notes:  All values were deflated by the consumer price index (1993=1.0) before the computation
of the means, except for foreign exchange. Foreign exchange was computed as foreign
exchange obtained from peanut oil exports minus foreign exchange used in the importation of
vegetable oil.  Processor surplus estimates do not include any further subsidies used to cover
any losses from oil trade.  Changes in welfare represent the economic surplus without SAP
minus the corresponding surplus with SAP implementation.  Note that in 1980-83 fertilizer
subsidies were still used, while for the 1984-95 period these subsidies and government-
sponsored credit were eliminated.